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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Objectives: Technological innovation in medicine is a significant driver of healthcare 
spending growth in the United States. Factors driving adoption and utilization of new 
technology is poorly understood, however market forces may play a significant role. 
Vascular surgery has experienced a surge in development of new devices and serves 
as an ideal case study. Specifically, the share of total abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) 
repairs performed by endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) increased rapidly from 
32% in 2001 to 65% in 2006 with considerable variation between states. This paper 
hypothesizes that that hospitals in competitive markets were early EVAR adopters and 
had improved AAA repair outcomes. 
Methods: The Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) and linked Hospital Market Structure 
(HMS) data was queried for patients who underwent repair for non-ruptured AAA in 
2003. In HMS the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI, range 0-1) is a validated and 
widely accepted economic measure of competition. Hospital markets were defined 
using a variable geographic radius that encompassed 90% of discharged patients. 
Bivariable and multivariable linear and logistic regression analyses were performed for 
the dependent variable of EVAR use. A propensity score-adjusted multivariate logistic 
regression model was used to control for treatment bias in the assessment of 
competition on AAA-repair outcomes. 
Results: A weighted total of 21,600 patients was included in the analyses. Patients at 
more competitive hospitals (lower HHI) were at increased odds of undergoing EVAR vs. 
open repair (Odds Ratio 1.127 per 0.1 decrease in HHI, P<0.0127) after adjusting for 
patient demographics, co-morbidities and hospital level factors (bed size, teaching 3 
 
status, AAA repair volume and ownership). Competition was not associated with 
differences in in-hospital mortality or vascular, neurologic or other minor post-operative 
complications. 
Conclusion: Greater hospital competition is significantly associated with increased 
EVAR adoption at a time when diffusion of this technology passed its tipping point. 
Hospital competition does not influence post-AAA repair outcomes. These results 
suggest that adoption of novel technology is not solely driven by clinical indications, but 
may also be influenced by market forces.  
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GLOSSARY LISTING 
 
AAA = abdominal aortic aneurysm 
CBO = Congressional Budget Office 
CEA = cost effectiveness analysis 
CER = comparative effectiveness research 
EVAR = endovascular aneurysm repair 
FDA = Food and Drug Administration 
HCUP = Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project 
HHI = Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
HMS = Hospital Market Structure 
NIS = Nationwide Inpatient Sample 
US = United States 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  The United States is a global leader in healthcare innovation. In 2001, Victor 
Fuchs and Harold Sox published the most widely cited list of thirty major innovations in 
medicine.[1] Selected medical devices, diagnostic tools, drugs and other therapeutics 
were identified based on the frequency of subject-related publications in the Journal of 
the American Medical Association and New England Journal of Medicine between 1976 
and 2001. Impressively, the vast majority originated in the United States including 
magnetic resonance imaging and computed tomography scanning, balloon angioplasty 
(through collaborations with Switzerland), mammography, coronary artery bypass graft 
surgery, cataract extraction and lens implants, among others. These and other 
innovations have collectively improved the quality of life for hundreds of millions of 
individuals around the world and have had an integral role in the vitality of domestic and 
global economies.  
Innovation, however, is expensive. Between 1965 and 2005, per-capita 
healthcare expenditures in the US increased nearly six-fold.[2] In a 1996 survey of 46 of 
the world’s leading health economists, 81% agreed that technological changes in 
medicine were the primary reason for the rise in healthcare spending.[3] Indeed, this 
has been supported by numerous health economics studies. In his 1992 study, Joseph 
Newhouse estimated technological advancements in medicine could account for greater 
than 65% of growth in real health care spending per capita between 1940 and 1990.[4] 
In 2008 the Congressional Budget Office published a report on growth in healthcare 
spending in the US.[2] They estimated that that technology-related changes in medical 
practices are the major driver of healthcare spending and can account for up to 62% of 7 
 
growth in real health spending per capita. Recent estimates are more conservative and 
suggest that medical technology may account for 27-48% of spending growth.[5] 
The benefit and costs of investing in medical innovation have been debated 
extensively.[6] In a 2001 study published in the journal Health Affairs, Mark McClellan 
and David Cutler present five case studies in support of their argument that technology 
investment is worthwhile. For example, they found that for every one dollar spent on the 
development of cardiac catheterization technology, the value gain was seven dollars 
based on data extracted from Medicare claims records.  Value was measured 
monetarily; each year of life expectancy gained was valued at $100,000.  
However, adoption behaviors and technology diffusion are not always 
incentivized to select for “high-value” innovation. There continue to be significant time-
lags between the discovery of proven, life-saving interventions, such as initial treatment 
of myocardial infarction with aspirin, and widespread implementation of this 
knowledge.[7] Yet new technologies such as robotic surgery have been adopted rapidly 
despite their tremendous cost, lack of additional insurance reimbursement for robotic 
costs, and limited efficacy data.[8] In 2009, up to 85% of radical prostatectomies were 
performed robotically.[8] The addition of a single robot per 100,000 men in a hospital 
market was associated with a 30% increase in the rate of total radical 
prostatectomies.[8] Coronary computed tomography angiography was introduced in 
2004 and experienced immense popularity and uptake despite lackluster clinical 
evidence and poor cost-effectiveness.[9]  
Indeed, adoption behaviors in medicine are nuanced. Donald Berwick described 
three “clusters of influence”. The first cluster is perceived benefit of change and features 
of the technology or the device itself including “trialability” and “observability”.[7]  8 
 
Second, individuals can be classified into five categories based on their adoption 
practices: innovators, early adopters, early majority adopters, later majority adopters 
and laggards.[10] Third, contextual factors such as communication, incentives, 
leadership and management all play a critical role in determining how innovation is 
perceived and integrated into an existing practice or setting. 
Additional factors have been associated with adoption of new technology.[11] 
These include adopters’ perceptions of the adoption behavior of individuals around 
them. Awareness about new technology often occurs through impersonal sources such 
as journals, meetings and conferences. Personal discussions with colleagues may be 
more important closer to the time of actual adoption.[12] In surgery, learning how to use 
a new technology requires the adopter to incur additional costs such as cost of training 
through didactic courses or animal models and retrofitting new technology into older 
operating rooms. Therefore, technologies that are lower cost to implement may be 
adopted faster.  Adopters assess expected monetary gains. Ladapo et al demonstrated 
that hospitals with higher operating margins are significantly more likely to adopt CT 
angiography.[9] In the case of robotic prostatectomy, hospitals operating in regions 
where a large proportion of surrounding hospitals already had robots were more 
significantly more likely to adopt robotic technology.[8] Hospitals compete amongst each 
other for surgical volume, therefore adoption of highly marketable technologies may be 
a necessity for financial well-being.[13]  
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Purpose of inquiry 
The focus of this paper is the investigation of factors associated with the adoption 
of new medical technology. The literature, as summarized above, suggests numerous 
factors are at play. However, market factors may have a significant role.  The 
hypothesis tested here posits that hospitals existing in more competitive markets are 
more likely to adopt new medical technology. Hospitals in competitive markets may 
seek to distinguish themselves from their competitors by offering new procedures or 
services, especially when those provide distinct differences in patient experiences. The 
ability to market new technology may also be a mechanism for building patient volume 
and sustaining clinical income. Given disparate adoption behaviors, this paper also 
investigates the impact competition may have on outcomes for patients. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to determine whether competition is associated with the adoption 
and utilization of all types of medical innovation, therefore a case-study approach 
focusing on the adoption of a new method for repair of abdominal aortic aneurysms was 
used to answer the questions posed above.   
Vascular surgery has experienced a surge in surgical device innovation since the 
late 1990s, predominantly in the development of endovascular technology. In 1999 
endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) was approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) as a novel technology for minimally invasive abdominal aortic 
aneurysm (AAA) repair. The primary goal of AAA repair is prevention of aneurysmal 
rupture, which is associated with a mortality rate approaching 80%.[14] In the case of 
EVAR, the choice between bilateral groin incisions vs. midline laparotomy for traditional 
open AAA repair may attract patients seeking a less invasive treatment. Currently, 
EVAR is the most common method of repair for non-ruptured AAA in the US. This 10 
 
technology was identified as an ideal case study for the assessment of whether 
competition between hospitals is associated with greater technology adoption and 
utilization and what impact competition has on patient outcomes.  
Similar to robotic prostatectomy, EVAR was rapidly adopted and between 2001 
and 2007 its utilization increased by 105%.[15] Recent data, however, suggests that 
there are geographic differences in EVAR utilization between states.[16] This raises 
concern about appropriate use of technology and has implications for health care 
spending growth. Data from the EVAR 1 trial, a large randomized control trial conducted 
in the United Kingdom, demonstrated that total average cost of aneurysm-related 
procedures for EVAR patients during eight years of follow up is $4,568 (USD) more than 
open repair patients, while demonstrating no significant improvement in long-term 
aneurysm-related mortality between EVAR and open AAA repair.[17] These and other 
data provide impetus to understand what factors drive adoption of a potential costly 
technology. 
  Prior literature on factors associated with adoption and utilization of EVAR is 
limited. A 2012 retrospective analysis of the California Office of Statewide Health 
Planning ad Development inpatient database found that among 33,277 patients with 
AAA, 35% underwent EVAR.[18] Significant predictors of EVAR utilization included 
calendar year, older age, male gender, non-ruptured status, teaching hospital and 
higher volume hospital. The authors also noted found that the rate of EVAR between 
2001 and 2008 occurred primarily in areas of California without large academic medical 
centers.  
In this paper, the degree of competition between hospitals in pre-defined markets 
is quantified using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI). HHI is a measure of hospital 11 
 
market competition.[19] A detailed description of this index and its calculation are 
presented in the methods section. In general, HHI is a widely accepted and validated 
measure of competition used by the Department of Justice, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and other governing organizations to determine the degree of competition 
in various commercial markets.[20] For example, in 2008 the Department of Justice 
used this index to rule that a proposed merger between UnitedHealth Group and Sierra 
Health Services Inc. would substantially reduce competition (increase in HHI of 0.1625) 
in the health insurance market in Nevada .[21]  
In summary, the specific aims of this paper are to 1) describe EVAR utilization 
trends between 2001 and 2007; 2) determine whether hospitals operating in more 
competitive markets, as quantified by HHI, have greater utilization of EVAR versus 
traditional open-AAA repair; and 3) assess whether greater competition leads to 
decreased in-hospital mortality, length of stay and post-operative complications, 
consistent with the economic notion that competition promotes improvement in 
productivity, outcomes and lowers costs.  
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METHODS 
 
 
Data sources 
The 2001-2007 Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) and 2003 Hospital Market 
Structure (HMS) files published by the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) 
were used to assess the impact of hospital market competition on EVAR adoption and 
AAA-repair outcomes.  NIS is the nation’s largest all-payer inpatient database that 
provides a twenty percent stratified sample of hospital admissions.  
In the HMS files, hospital competition is quantified using HHI. Each hospital 
within a market has a share of the market, as defined by the number of discharges from 
that hospital divided by the total number of discharges from all hospitals in the market. 
HHI is calculated as the sum of squared market shares for all hospitals existing in 
markets defined by geopolitical boundaries, fixed radius, variable radius and patient flow 
according to methods described by Wong et al.[19] It ranges from approaching zero 
(highly competitive) to one (monopoly). HHI not only reflects the number of competitors 
within a market, but also the equity of distribution of market share. More competitors 
lead to a more competitive market, but more importantly balanced market shares 
among competitors also have a strong effect on competition. A sample calculation of 
HHI is provided in Figure 1.   
HMS files are published for linkage with 1997, 2000 and 2003 NIS data. The 
2003 data file was selected in order to analyze the impact of hospital market 
competition on EVAR adoption after EVAR was approved by the FDA in late 1999 and 
before it surpassed utilization of open-repair in 2004.[15] 652 out of 994 hospitals 
surveyed in the 2003 NIS had HHI data and were included in our analysis.  Entire 
hospital markets were not excluded if an individual hospital in the market had missing 13 
 
HHI.  A hospital’s HHI incorporates the presence of all hospitals in the market, even if a 
single hospital in that market does not have its own HHI value.  
Patient level observations in NIS were supplemented with state-level data 
obtained from The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts online 
database and Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care online database to account for variations 
in malpractice claim payments, number of vascular surgeons and total health 
expenditures per state.[22, 23] 
 
Study design 
Patients who underwent repair for non-ruptured AAA (ICD-9CM 441.4, 441.9) by 
open or endovascular technique (ICD-9CM 38.34, 38.44, 38.64, 39.71) in 2003 at 
hospitals for which HHI data was available were included in our analysis (weighted N= 
21,600).  Hospital markets were defined using a variable geographic radius that 
encompassed 90% of discharged patients. This market definition accounts for the fact 
that hospitals do not compete within confined geographic boundaries. The same cohort 
of patients was queried for post-AAA repair outcomes including in-hospital death, length 
of stay, vascular complications (including graft complication, embolism or infection)and 
major post-operative complications as defined by the National Surgical Quality 
Improvement Program (NSQIP).[24]  
 
Statistical analysis 
EVAR and open-AAA repair data was plotted between 2001 and 2007 to analyze 
usage trends.  State-level EVAR adoption for hospitals performing greater than ten 14 
 
AAA-repairs was plotted for each year between 2001 and 2007 using EpiInfo
TM software 
published by the Centers for Disease Control.[25]  
Bivariable logistic regression analyses was conducted to determine the 
association between hospital competition, and potential confounders, and the outcome 
of EVAR adoption in 2003. State-level variables, including total number of malpractice 
claims, average malpractice claim payment, average number of vascular surgeons, and 
average health expenditures per state, were included to control for potential 
confounders considered in previous studies.[15] Patient co-morbidities were controlled 
using the Elixhauser method.[26] Covariates that were significant in bivariate analysis 
(P < 0.05) were entered into a multivariable logistic regression model with backwards 
selection for the dependent variable of EVAR use.  Statistical significance was defined 
by a type I error threshold of 0.05, corresponding to 95% confidence intervals.  
Propensity score-weighted outcome models were used to control for treatment 
bias in the assessment of hospital competition, as measured by HHI, on post-operative 
AAA-repair outcomes in 2003. Propensity scores were first generated using a 
multivariable logistic regression model for the dependent variable of EVAR repair using 
covariates (patient demographics, co-morbidities, hospital and state-level factors) 
significant in bivariate logistic regression analysis (P<0.10) .[27]
  The inverse of each 
score was subsequently used to assign a weight to each patient to balance their 
treatment probability. Using propensity-score weighted data, individual multivariable 
logistic regression models were generated to study associations between hospital 
competition and post operative outcomes of  in-hospital mortality, duration of hospital 
stay, vascular complication (graft embolism, infection or other complication) and 
standard post-operative complications as defined by NSQIP.  Potential confounders 15 
 
considered earlier were adjusted for in each model. All data linkages and statistical 
analyses were conducted using SAS version 9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC).  
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RESULTS 
EVAR utilization trends 
National EVAR adoption increased rapidly between 2001 and 2007:  33.61% 
(±1.96) of total non-ruptured AAA-repair procedures were performed by EVAR in 2001 
as compared to 72.20%  (±1.14) in 2007.  EVAR surpassed open-AAA repair with 
52.28% (±1.87) utilization nationwide in 2004 (Figure 2). Geographic variation in percent 
EVAR adoption between 2001 and 2007 was also observed (Figure 3). The total 
number of AAA-repair procedures conducted between 2001 and 2007 did not 
significantly increase. Approximately 39,500 total non-ruptured AAA repairs were 
performed in 2001 as compared to 38,972 in 2007. 
 
Predictors of EVAR utilization    
In 2003, a weighted total of 21,600 patients underwent AAA-repair at hospitals 
for which HHI data was available. Of these patients, 48.52% (±2.07) underwent EVAR.  
On average, EVAR patients were older (73.55 vs. 71.59, P<0.0001) and a higher 
percentage were male (83.34% vs. 76.30%, P<0.0001). There were significant 
differences in patient co-morbidities including higher incidence of congestive heart 
failure, peripheral vascular disease, chronic pulmonary disease, renal failure, 
coagulopathy, weight loss, fluid and electrolyte disorders, chronic blood loss anemia, 
alcohol abuse and psychoses in open-AAA repair patients. There was significantly 
higher incidence of uncomplicated diabetes mellitus and solid tumors in EVAR patients 
(Table 1-3). There were no significant differences in race or socioeconomic status. 
EVAR patients underwent their procedure at more competitive hospitals with lower 
HHI (mean HHI = 0.15 vs. 0.19, P<0.0004) and hospitals with higher AAA-repair volume 17 
 
(mean annual AAA-repair cases = 59.63 vs. 41.26, P <0.0001).  EVAR patients were 
also more likely to have undergone procedures at private, urban and teaching hospitals 
(Table 1-3). State-level factors were not significantly associated with EVAR use, 
including total number of malpractice claims, average malpractice claim payment, 
average number of vascular surgeons per state and average health expenditures per 
state. 
In multivariable analysis the effect of hospital competition on the dependent 
variable of EVAR use remained significant (OR 1.127 per 0.1 decrease in HHI, CI: 
1.102, 1.154, P<0.0127) after adjusting for age, gender, co-morbidities, admission 
status, and hospital location, ownership and AAA-repair volume (Table IV).  Total AAA 
repairs per hospital remained significantly associated (OR 1.008, CI: 1.005, 1.011, 
P<0.0001) with EVAR adoption as did elective admission status (OR 1.704, CI: 1.272, 
2.282, P<0.0004). Older patients remained at increased odds of undergoing EVAR (OR 
1.041, CI: 1.032, 1.051, P<0.0001) as did males (OR 1.631, CI:1.379, 1.931, 
P<0.0001).  Patients with diabetes or solid tumors were more likely to undergo EVAR, 
but patients with a number of other significant co-morbidities, including peripheral 
vascular disorders, coagulopathies, fluid and electrolyte disorders, deficiency anemias, 
solid tumors, and congestive heart failure were less likely (Table 4). 
Propensity score-weighted outcome models were used to control for treatment 
bias in the assessment of competition on AAA-repair outcomes. Covariate balancing 
between EVAR and open-AAA repair patients was confirmed using bivariate logistic 
regression analysis (Table 5). The average in-hospital mortality for EVAR patients was 
2.00% (±0.51) as compared to 4.48% (±0.38) for open-AAA repair patients.  Open 
repair patients were hospitalized longer (mean length of stay = 9.23±0.18 days) and had 18 
 
a higher frequency of post-operative myocardial infarction (MI), cardiac complications, 
pulmonary embolism, major neurological complication (cerebral vascular accident or 
coma) and minor complications. EVAR patients, however, had greater frequency of 
vascular complications (9.72% ±4.23).  
Multivariable logistic regression analysis in the propensity-weighted outcome 
model revealed that hospital competition was not significantly associated with in-
hospital mortality, length of stay, or vascular, cardiac, neurologic or other minor post-
operative complications following open-AAA repair or EVAR.  Patients who underwent 
either open-AAA repair or EVAR at less competitive hospitals (higher HHI) had 
decreased odds of post-operative myocardial infarction (MI) (OR 0.048, 95% CI: 0.003, 
0.699, P<0.0263) after adjusting for AAA-repair procedure type, patient age, elective 
admission status, hospital teaching status, and patient co-morbidities.   
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DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 
Numerous factors are associated with variation in the adoption of new 
technology. This paper investigates the impact of competition between hospitals on 
adoption behavior and patient outcomes using a case study of EVAR technology, which 
was introduced in 1999 as a revolutionary new technique for repair of abdominal aortic 
aneurysms. 
This paper describes a novel association between greater hospital competition 
and increased EVAR adoption. In 2003, when EVAR was not the predominant 
technique of AAA-repair, more competitive hospitals were at significantly increased 
odds of utilizing EVAR. This held true after adjusting for differences in patient 
demographics, co-morbidities, and hospital-level factors.  This paper also confirms 
historical trends in EVAR utilization between 2001 and 2007, and using choropleth 
maps demonstrates that there is geographic variation in EVAR utilization across time. 
As has been confirmed by numerous studies, EVAR is now the most common AAA-
repair method.[15, 28, 29] 
While competition in non-healthcare industries typically promotes improvement in 
quality of goods or services and leads to decreased costs, greater competition between 
hospitals was not significantly associated with reduction in in-hospital mortality, length of 
stay, or most major or minor post-operative complications after AAA-repair. Patients 
who underwent AAA-repair at more competitive hospitals were at increased odds of 
post-operative MI.  
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The role of competition 
The association between greater hospital competition and greater EVAR 
adoption is not surprising. Several potential mechanisms may explain this association. 
Competitive hospitals are likely composed of physicians who seek to distinguish 
themselves through innovation or early adoption of new technology. Competitive 
hospitals may also have greater resources, both monetary and physical, facilitating 
early adoption behavior. In the case of EVAR, secondary competitive gains can be 
achieved. Adopting new technologies like EVAR allows hospitals to distinguish 
themselves as centers of innovation. This is a powerful marketing tool.  Competitive 
hospitals also stand to benefit from supplementary revenue procured from increased 
utilization of imaging services, rehabilitation providers and expertise from vascular 
medicine.  Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that decision-making at the 
institutional level is arbitrary in nature, allowing competition to have a stronger effect 
than it may otherwise have. A case analysis of the decision making process involved in 
the adoption of EVAR by Canadian academic health centers found that surprisingly few 
stakeholders are involved. Decisions in two academic centers were largely based on 
perceived benefit to patient outcomes, improved safety and surgeons’ desire to 
innovate.[30]  
In this paper, EVAR was used as a case study to determine whether market 
forces influence adoption behaviors. The trends and findings presented here are 
consistent with adoption behaviors in other areas of medicine and surgery.[7, 9, 12, 31-
35]  For example, hospitals functioning in more competitive markets were more likely to 
adopt laparoscopic colectomy for colon cancer resection between 2002 and 2007.[35]  
A 0.10 increase in HHI, or movement towards monopoly, was associated with a lower 21 
 
likelihood of undergoing laproscopic colectomy. The same increase in HHI was also 
associated with a 1.6% higher price for laparoscopic procedure, suggesting competition 
may decrease costs. Non-profit hospitals in more competitive markets were more likely 
to adopt radioisotope technology for nuclear medicine in the 1970s.[36] Fertility clinics 
operating in competition markets offered new intracytoplasmic sperm injection 
technology earlier than clinics in less competitive markets.[37]  Competition has also 
been associated with duplication of hospital services within a geographic region. A 1972 
survey of 3,584 community hospitals found that institutions surrounded by a greater 
number of other hospitals increased the availability of mammography, emergency 
services, cobalt therapy, heart surgery and cardiac catheterization facilities. This 
suggests that hospitals may invest in expensive facilities in order to compete with 
surrounding hospitals for greater patient volume.[38] However, other studies suggest 
competition has the opposite effect. Greater hospital competition has also been 
inversely associated with adoption of 64 slice computed tomography scanners.[9] This 
contradicts the traditional economic notion that competition should improve innovation 
and diffusion of technology. The study by Ladapo et al did not report CT ownership for 
20% of hospitals. Of those excluded, the majority were for-profit hospitals that may have 
been more susceptible to market competition pressures.  
 
Factors beyond hospital competition 
Innovation in medicine is largely motivated by the opportunity to improve quality 
of care and improve outcomes for patients. Therefore, it was anticipated that clinical 
indications might also explain EVAR adoption trends. Indeed, prior studies have 
attributed variation in EVAR utilization to geographic differences in the prevalence of 22 
 
diabetes, vascular disease, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with the premise 
that EVAR is reserved for sicker patients.[15] This paper demonstrates that patients 
with diabetes and solid tumors are more likely to undergo EVAR as are older patients 
who may be considered higher surgical risk. However, high risk patients with multiple 
other co-morbidities including peripheral vascular disorders, coagulopathies, fluid and 
electrolyte disorders, deficiency anemias, solid tumors, and congestive heart failure 
were significantly less likely to undergo EVAR.  This may suggest EVAR was being 
adopted without consideration of its intended demographic. In 2003, however, EVAR 
was still not widely adopted. Surgeons with relatively little EVAR experience may have 
initially employed this technology in healthier patients who had fewer co-morbidities.  
 EVAR adoption was not associated with patient demographics including race 
and socioeconomic status. It is conceivable that hospitals operating in states that have 
stricter malpractice laws or a greater density of vascular surgeons may be more likely to 
adopt the new technology. However variation in average state malpractice claims, and 
average number of vascular surgeons per state was not associated with greater EVAR 
utilization, confirming previously published data.[15] Patients admitted electively were 
more likely to undergo EVAR. This may be attributed to increased time surgeons 
needed to evaluate patients and determine anatomical suitability during these early 
years of EVAR adoption. 
Other hospital-level factors including bed size, location and ownership did not 
significantly predict EVAR adoption with the exception of hospital AAA-repair volume.  
Hospitals with greater surgical volume may benefit from greater expertise in the field 
that permits early adoption behavior. Hospitals with more experience in EVAR repair 
may also have additional resources and funding to adopt new technology. 23 
 
Implications of hospital competition  
As a driver of EVAR adoption, hospital competition has important implications for 
social welfare, hospital costs and health policy. Ideally, competition between hospitals 
should improve quality of care and patient outcomes.  In one of the early studies 
investigating this association, retrospective analysis found that hospital competition led 
to lower rates of adverse outcomes in non-rural elderly Medicare beneficiaries 
hospitalized for heart disease treatment after 1990.[39] In this paper, associations 
between greater hospital competition and AAA-repair outcomes including in-hospital 
mortality, length of stay, and NSQIP complications were assessed. Consistent with the 
economic notion that competition improves the quality of goods and services, it was 
anticipated that greater competition would have a comparable effect on measures of 
social welfare. Using propensity score weighted multivariable analysis, competition was 
found to neither improve nor worsen these outcomes with the exception of post-
operative MI as patients at more competitive hospitals had higher risk of post-operative 
MI. There may have been unknown factors associated with a higher risk of MI in more 
competitive hospitals, such as referral of more complex patients to larger hospitals, 
which was unable to be control for in this analysis.   
The study of competition and its effect on patient outcomes was limited to 2003 
when EVAR adoption was still in an early phase of adoption. Many vascular specialists 
were still performing EVAR in low volumes. Their limited experience with this new 
technology may have modified the expected relationship between increased hospital 
volume and improved AAA-repair outcomes. Indeed, outcomes from early EVAR trials 
may have reflected the experience of expert surgeons who were pioneers in EVAR 
development.  24 
 
Competition and cost of EVAR 
Traditional economics principles support the association of greater competition 
among providers leads to lower cost for consumers. However, in health care, evidence 
suggests that competition may have no impact on cost or may even increase costs.  
Greater competition is associated with higher hospital gross charges for 
appendectomies, carotid endarterectomies, bariatric operations, radical 
prostatectomies, and pyloromyotomies.[40] In an editorial published in the Harvard 
Business Review, health economist and health policy expert Michael Porter argues that 
competition is the “root problem with US health care performance”.[41] Specifically, 
competition in healthcare has not increased value for health care consumers. Data from 
the EVAR1 trial in the United Kingdom estimates that during eight years of follow up, the 
total average cost of aneurysm-related procedures for EVAR patients in the United 
Kingdom is $4,568 US more than it is for open-repair patients.[17] It is concerning, then, 
that competition between hospitals is driving adoption of a costly technology that may 
not have significantly better outcomes for patients. 
Vascular surgeons are not strangers to surgical innovation. Technology adoption 
is multi-factorial, but with evidence that competition may increase these practices, there 
is increasing concern about responsible acquisition and use of technology, especially in 
light of ongoing fiscal concerns.[16]  While some technologies such as EVAR prove to 
be beneficial, many other technologies do not demonstrate significant clinical benefit or 
are not cost effective. Leaders in vascular surgery should acknowledge the impact of 
non-clinical factors such as hospital competition as they guide the development and 
implementation of future vascular technology. 
 25 
 
Beyond EVAR 
  These data provide insight into adoption behaviors surrounding new technology 
in the medical industry. Specifically, medical device adoption is subject to intense 
market forces. Hospitals and providers compete with one another for patients and are 
incentivized to adopt highly marketable technologies in order to attract greater patient 
volume. Consideration of added value of a new device, procedure, or drug is frequently 
overlooked.  There is evidence to suggest this is the case for technologies such as 
EVAR and robotic prostatectomy. More concerning is the fact that new technology may 
change the clinical indications for a procedure that has not been previously 
demonstrated; since the introduction of robotic prostatectomy the rate of total 
prostatectomies performed in the US has increased substantially. [13] In this paper, the 
total number of AAA-repair procedures has remained constant over time, despite the 
introduction of EVAR. 
  The current state of health care delivery is unsustainable if healthcare spending 
continues to increase at the same rate. Moderation of future spending may be achieved 
through reform efforts that call for more selective regulation and screening of new 
innovations. Competition should not be stifled, but rather incentives should be aligned to 
ensure competition is not a “zero-sum” proposition. This may be achieved through 
comparative-effectiveness and cost-effectiveness studies.  At its core, comparative 
effectiveness research (CER) seeks to compare health care treatments for the same 
indication to determine which works best, for whom, and under what circumstances. 
Cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) allows for comparison between different treatments 
while also taking into consideration differences in cost. By integrating cost data, CEA 
can be used to assign value to comparator drugs, treatments, devices or services.  26 
 
Because treatment outcomes are assessed using a common unit, it allows for 
comparisons to be made across all healthcare interventions regardless of indication. 
CEA provides decision makers with an objective and efficient way of understanding 
what interventions are most beneficial in the setting of limited health care resources.[42]  
To this end, regulation agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration may 
require these studies as part of a new medical device application. Notably, there have 
been several attempts to formally use CEA as one of many criteria for determining 
reimbursement coverage for new technology.  In 1989, a CMS proposal for CEA met 
with resistance and was never adopted.[43] This occurred during a time of relative 
economic prosperity in the U.S. and thus the pressure to adopt mechanisms to control 
health care costs were not as prominent as they are now.  In 2003, the Medicare 
Modernization Act (MMA) established its support for comparative effectiveness research 
but with important caveats, namely the prohibition of formal cost-effectiveness analyses 
or the use of CER for mandating national standards of clinical practice.[44]  However, 
the act permitted private payers to exercise their own judgment when assembling drug 
formulary lists, thereby increasing potential for use of CEA analysis.  In 2009, Title VIII 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment act authorized $1.1 billion for clinical 
effectiveness research, but again with no explicit endorsement of cost analysis.[44]   
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to CEA has been the lack of public support and 
fear that cost-analyses will lead to rationing of care. Most Americans do not recognize 
CEA as a way to promote value; rather it is primarily viewed as a cost-containment 
maneuver.[44] There is a widespread belief that physicians and individuals, not 
government, should make treatment decisions and fear that CEA will further impede 27 
 
personalized medicine initiatives.[42, 45] This dissent is particularly vehement among 
the elderly and patients with chronic illnesses.[46]  Unfortunately, many of these 
patients are recipients of expensive care that yields only incremental benefit.  The 
United States is a leader in health care innovation and Americans have a fondness for 
new technology. Therefore cost-analyses are perceived as adding further insult to injury 
by limiting public access to novel treatments.[47] 
These obstacles aside, future health reform should be targeted towards aligning 
incentives in new technology approval and adoption, especially in the context of 
competitive behavior between hospitals. 
 
Limitations  
This study has several limitations. The impact of hospital competition on EVAR 
adoption and outcomes was analyzed only in 2003 due to the availability of the Market 
Structure files at the time of analysis. However, 2003 was an appropriate year to 
analyze this association because EVAR was still in the early phases of adoption. While 
HHI is a validated measure of competition, it is not perfect. HHI calculations do not 
account for hospital networks, consolidations or partnerships.  The market definitions 
we used may not account for large centers that attract patients nationwide.  Additionally, 
HHI data was not available for hospitals from nine states. According to HCUP officials, 
data omission was random in nature and excluding these hospitals would not introduce 
bias into the analysis. Finally, there are a number of factors which may be associated 
with technology adoption that were unable to be accounted for including, but not limited 
to, hospital operating margins, presence or absence of ancillary hospital services, 
physician reimbursement schemes, provider age and training experience, variation in 28 
 
regional regulations for technology adoption, hospital access to capital.  Many of these 
factors are either not quantified or not available. Surgeons may also have a preference 
for adoption of EVAR versus utilization of standard open repair. This could not be 
accounted for in this analysis. It is a difficult variable to quantify but nonetheless an 
important one to acknowledge. Despite these limitations, this analysis linking hospital 
competition with greater early EVAR utilization provides important insights into the 
adoption of medical technology. 
 
Suggestions for Future Work 
  This study was limited to the assessment of competition in the adoption of EVAR. 
Future studies should investigate the role of market forces, such as competition, in the 
adoption of other technologies that have exhibited a similarly rapid rate of adoption and 
diffusion. While the NIS is the largest all-payer database in the United States, it is a 
stratified sample and does not capture all hospital discharges. This study may benefit 
from validation using additional datasets that overcome the limitations of the NIS. As 
mentioned, HHI is also not a perfect quantitative measure of hospital competition. 
Therefore investigation of new and more comprehensive metrics that account for its 
limitations previously outlined should be pursued. Additionally, competition exists in all 
aspects of healthcare. Future studies may consider using the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index or a comparable measure to quantify the extent of competition in these different 
realms. Our group is currently investigating the role of competition between transplant 
centers in donor kidney allocation. Finally, further analysis is merited to better 
understand how competition affects patient outcomes over time. The analysis presented 29 
 
here was limited to one year, whereas competition may influence these metrics of social 
welfare over time. 
SUMMARY 
 
This paper demonstrates that greater hospital competition is significantly 
associated with increased EVAR adoption at a time when diffusion of this technology 
had just passed its tipping point. Hospital competition does not influence post-AAA 
repair outcomes.  These results suggest that adoption of novel vascular technology is 
not solely driven by clinical indications, but may also be influenced by market forces.   
These findings provide insight into adoption of medical technology in general. 
These results may help guide future healthcare policy designed to limit growing costs 
associated with technology development.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Characteristics of EVAR vs. open AAA repair patients 
Variable  Weighted frequency (S.E.) 
  TOTAL 
(Weighted 
N=21,600) 
EVAR 
(Weighted 
N=10,480) 
OPEN 
(Weighted N=11,120) 
Age in years (mean)  72.64 (±0.12)  73.55 (±0.20)  71.59 (±0.17) 
       
Race:       
White  86.65 (±0.60)  87.03 (±0.88)  86.44 (±0.87) 
Black  3.15 (±0.31)  2.81 (±0.43)  3.33 (±0.46) 
Hispanic  4.18 (±0.35)  3.90 (±0.51)  4.43 (±0.52) 
Asian/Pacific Islander  2.31 (±0.27)  2.41 (±0.41)  2.30 (±0.39) 
Native American  0.06 (±0.05)  0.08 (±0.08)  0.06 (±0.06) 
Other  3.65 (±0.03)  3.77 (±0.48)  3.44 (±0.45) 
       
Female gender:  20.04 (±0.51)  16.66 (±0.74)  23.70 (±0.68) 
       
Median income by zip 
code:  
     
Q1 (lowest)  18.14 (±0.56)  17.93 (±0.82)  18.15 (±0.80) 
Q2  26.35 (±0.64)  26.13 (±0.95)  26.36 (±0.91) 
Q3  29.76 (±0.67)  28.95 (±0.98)  30.51 (±0.97) 
Q4 (highest)  25.75 (±0.63)  26.99 (±0.95)  24.98 (±0.89) 
       
Primary payer:       
Medicare  78.49 (±0.60)  80.86 (±0.84)  76.49 (±0.88) 
Medicaid  1.31 (±0.17)  1.11 (±0.23)  1.45 (±0.25) 
Private including HMO  18.36 (±0.56)  16.12 (±0.79)  20.18 (±0.83) 
Self pay  0.48 (±0.10)  0.29 (±0.11)  0.66 (±0.17) 
No charge  0.10 (±0.04)  0.09 (±0.06)  0.11 (±0.07) 
Other  1.26 (±0.16)  1.48 (±0.26)  1.10 (±0.21) 
       
Patient county of 
residence: 
     36 
 
Large metropolitan  55.93 (±0.66)  57.26 (±1.02)  55.20 (±0.98) 
Small metropolitan  26.37 (±0.61)  25.72 (±0.91)  26.93 (±0.89) 
Micropolitan  9.71 (±0.40)  9.99 (±0.62)  9.25 (±0.58) 
Other  7.99 (±0.38)  7.03 (±0.54)  8.62 (±0.57) 
       
Co-morbidity       
Congestive heart 
failure 
0.16 (±0.01)  0.05 (±0.03)  0.27 (±0.11) 
Valvular disease  0.11 (±0.06)  0.09 (±0.06)  0.13 (±0.07) 
Pulmonary circulation 
disorders 
0.05 (±0.03)  0  0.06 (±0.04) 
Peripheral vascular 
disorders 
34.03 (±0.84)  31.72 (±1.04)  35.30 (±1.21) 
Hypertension  63.22 (±0.71)  64.09 (±1.03)  62.86 (±1.01) 
Paralysis  1.10 (±0.12)  1.24 (±0.20)  1.02 (±0.18) 
Neurological disorders  2.25 (±0.22)  2.20 (±0.31)  2.34 (±0.32) 
Chronic pulmonary 
disease 
32.71 (±0.79)  29.88 (±0.92)  37.07 (±1.06) 
Diabetes mellitus, 
uncomplicated 
11.49 (±0.43)  13.45 (±0.68)  10.19 (±0.52) 
Diabetes mellitus with 
chronic complications 
0.74 (±0.10)  0.68 (±0.14)  0.89 (±0.16) 
Hypothyroidism  5.36 (±0.34)  5.26 (±0.48)  5.47 (±0.48) 
Renal failure  3.90 (±0.25)  2.74 (±0.30)  4.97 (±0.42) 
Liver disease  1.09 (±0.15)  1.13 (±0.23)  1.07 (±0.21) 
Peptic ulcer disease 
without bleeding 
0.02 (±0.02)  0.02 (±0.02)  0 
Lymphoma  0.49 (±0.08)  0.66 (±0.14)  0.39 (±0.11) 
Metastatic cancer  0.46 (±0.07)  0.69 (±0.14)  0.32 (±0.10) 
Solid tumor without 
metastases 
2.32 (±0.19)  3.14 (±0.33)  1.72 (±0.21) 
Rheumatoid 
arthritis/collagen 
vascular diseases 
1.48 (±0.18)  1.41 (±0.26)  1.51 (±0.25) 
Coagulopathy  5.70 (±0.41)  2.38 (±0.37)  8.74 (±0.66) 
Obesity  4.55 (±0.30)  4.50 (±0.45)  4.74 (±0.44) 
Weight loss  1.56 (±0.20)  0.44 (±0.12)  2.31 (±0.31) 
Fluid and electrolyte 
disorders 
13.65 (±0.62)  6.09 (±0.52)  21.06 (±0.96) 
Chronic blood loss 
anemia 
1.02 (±0.15)  0.64 (±.017)  1.41 (±0.22) 
Deficiency anemias  7.33 (±0.46)  5.72 (±0.58)  9.48 (±0.70) 
Alcohol abuse  1.89 (±0.20)  1.39 (±0.28)  2.48 (±0.29) 
Drug abuse  0.18 (±0.06)  0.10 (±0.07)  0.28 (±0.11) 
Psychoses  1.03 (±0.12)  0.69 (±0.14)  1.48 (±0.20) 
Depression  2.33 (±0.22)  1.96 (±0.30)  2.50 (±0.33) 37 
 
       
Died during 
hospitalization 
2.96 (±0.22)  0.95 (±0.17)  4.40 (±0.38) 
Length of stay (mean)  6.66 (±0.15)  3.54 (±0.13)  9.08 (±0.14) 
       
Elective admission 
status: 
81.78 (±1.23)  88.33 (±1.60)  80.85 (±1.14) 
 
 
Table 2. Hospital characteristics for EVAR vs. OPEN AAA repair patients 
Variable  Weighted frequency (S.E.) 
  TOTAL 
(Weighted 
N=21,600) 
EVAR 
(Weighted 
N=10,480) 
OPEN 
(Weighted N=11,120) 
Hospital location:       
Urban  94.11 (±0.01)  95.05 (±0.35)  93.44 (±0.33) 
Rural  5.89 (±0.01)  4.95 (±0.35)  6.56 (±0.33) 
       
Hospital teaching 
status: 
     
Teaching  55.57 (±2.80)  61.01 (±3.88)  53.75 (±2.57) 
Non-teaching  44.43 (±2.80)  38.99 (±3.88)  46.25 (±2.57) 
       
Hospital bed size:       
Small  4.66 (±0.01)  3.82 (±0.27)  5.36 (±0.25) 
Medium  22.15 (±0.01)  19.25 (±0.61)  25.06 (±0.58) 
Large  73.19 (±0.01)  76.93 (±0.64)  69.58 (±0.61) 
       
Hospital control:       
Government or private, 
collapsed category 
67.87 (±2.57)  67.98 (±3.66)  66.10 (±2.39) 
Government, 
nonfederal, public 
3.06 (±0.82)  2.67 (±0.90)  3.55 (±0.96) 
Private, non-profit, 
voluntary 
20.59 (±2.29)  22.77 (±3.31)  19.45 (±1.95) 
Private, investor-
owned 
6.07 (±0.91)  5.03 (±1.36)  7.59 (±1.08) 
Private, collapsed 
category 
2.40 (±0.84)  1.54 (±0.71)  3.31 (±1.14) 
       
Geographic region:       
Northeast  21.92 (±3.00)  23.21 (±4.37)  21.04 (±2.41) 
Midwest  24.37 (±2.48)  21.73 (±3.46)  26.79 (±2.20) 
South  37.02 (±2.66)  37.62 (±3.78)  36.13 (±2.35) 38 
 
West  16.69 (±1.95)  17.45 (±3.08)  16.04 (±1.40) 
       
Hospital market 
characteristics 
(means): 
     
HHI in market defined 
by variable radius 
(90%) 
0.16 (±0.01)  0.15 (±0.01)  0.19 (±0.01) 
State Level Data:       
State health 
expenditures per capita 
(2004) in $ 
5,207 (±4.14)  5,172 (±9.16)  5,241 (±8.43) 
State hospital adjusted 
expenses per inpatient 
day in $ 
1,444 (±2.03)  1,449 (±4.07)  1,441 (±4.02) 
Total number of paid 
malpractice claims per 
state 
705.48 
(±44.91) 
789.06 (±61.37)  667.93 (±36.79) 
Average claims ($) 
paid per state 
283,033 
(±1,100) 
278,906 
(±1,783) 
287,095 (±1,752) 
Total number of 
hospitals per state 
164.04 
(±1..17) 
175.21 (±1.99)  154.31 (±1.87) 
Average number of 
vascular surgeons per 
100,000 per state 
0.72 (±0.01)  0.71 (±0.38)  0.73 (±0.38) 
Vascular Volume per 
Hospital 
     
Vascular volume per 
hospital estimated by 
total AAA repairs 
48.66 (±6.29)  59.63 (±7.94)  41.26 (±4.79) 39 
 
Table 3. Bivariable analysis for outcome of EVAR vs. open AAA repair 
Variable  Odds Ratio  95% CI  P Value 
Age in years (mean)  1.031  1.024, 1.039  <0.0001 
       
Race:       
White  Reference     
Black  0.934  0.639, 1.364  0.7228 
Hispanic  0.870  0.599, 1.262  0.4620 
Asian/Pacific Islander  1.042  0.615, 1.765  0.8787 
Native American  1.253  0.078, 20.213  0.8737 
Other  0.937  0.300, 2.929  0.9114 
Missing 23.13%       
       
Female gender:  0.633  0.564, 0.710  <0.0001 
       
Median income by zip 
code:  
     
Q1  0.884  0.704, 1.109  0.2867 
Q2  0.853  0.678, 1.073  0.1749 
Q3  0.865  0.690, 1.086  0.2124 
Q4  Reference     
       
Primary payer:        
Medicare  Reference     
Medicaid  0.800  0.524, 1.219  0.2985 
Private including HMO  0.744  0.639, 0.867  0.0001 
Self-pay  0.718  0.378, 1.364  0.3121 
No charge  1.198  0.297, 4.829  0.7993 
Other  1.173  0.696, 1.977  0.5498 
       
Patient county of 
residence: 
     
Large metropolitan  Reference     
Small metropolitan  0.823  0.641, 1.057  0.1267 
Micropolitan  0.817  0.626, 1.066  0.1366 
Other  0.735  0.553, 0.977  0.0339 
       
Co-morbidity       
Congestive heart failure  0.041  0.006, 0.284  0.0012 
Valvular disease  0.491  0.146, 1.657  0.2519 
Peripheral vascular 
disorders 
0.759  0.671, 0.857  <0.0001 
Hypertension  1.082  0.962, 1.218  0.1906 
Paralysis  1.182  0.751, 1.862  0.4691 
Neurological disorders  1.071  0.807, 1.421  0.6334 40 
 
Chronic pulmonary 
disease 
0.724  0.656, 0.800  <0.0001 
Diabetes mellitus, 
uncomplicated 
1.335  1.158, 1.540  <0.0001 
Diabetes mellitus with 
chronic complications 
0.806  0.472, 1.378  0.4306 
Hypothyroidism  1.037  0.831, 1.295  0.7480 
Renal failure  0.519  0.388, 0.695  <0.0001 
Liver disease  1.172  0.686, 2.000  0.5616 
Lymphoma  1.835  0.927, 3.634  0.0814 
Metastatic cancer  2.345  1.124, 4.891  0.0230 
Solid tumor without 
metastases 
1.845  1.360, 2.502  <0.0001 
Rheumatoid 
arthritis/collagen vascular 
diseases 
1.085  0.743, 1.583  0.6743 
Coagulopathy  0.249  0.180, 0.343  <0.0001 
Obesity  0.942  0.727, 1.221  0.6536 
Weight loss  0.165  0.097, 0.282  <0.0001 
Fluid and electrolyte 
disorders 
0.244  0.201, 0.296  <0.0001 
Chronic blood loss anemia  0.449  0.260, 0.774  0.0040 
Deficiency anemias  0.602  0.476, 0.761  <0.0001 
Alcohol abuse  0.565  0.361, 0.884  0.0125 
Drug abuse  0.398  0.077, 2.062  0.2723 
Psychoses  0.497  0.312, 0.791  0.0032 
Depression  0.967  0.704, 1.327  0.8347 
       
Elective admission 
status 
1.845  1.447, 2.352  <0.0001 
       
Urban hospital location  1.779  1.051, 3.009  0.0318 
       
Teaching hospital  1.345  1.036, 1.747  0.0262 
       
Hospital bed size:       
Small  0.982  0.487, 1.979  0.9591 
Medium  0.607  0.439, 0.839  0.0025 
Large  Reference     
       
Hospital control:       
Government or private, 
collapsed category 
Reference     
Government, nonfederal, 
public 
0.728  0.447, 1.186  0.2026 
Private, non-profit,  1.118  0.834, 1.501  0.4553 41 
 
voluntary 
Private, investor-owned  0.671  0.379, 1.189  0.1718 
Private, collapsed 
category 
0.459  0.246, 0.858  0.0146 
       
Geographic region:       
Northeast  Reference     
Midwest  0.730  0.463, 1.151  0.1762 
South  0.923  0.618, 1.380  0.6977 
West  0.975  0.602, 1.580  0.9177 
       
Hospital market 
characteristics: 
 
     
HHI in market defined by 
variable radius (90%) 
0.192  0.077, 0.478  0.0004 
Vascular volume per 
hospital estimated by total 
AAA procedures in 2003 
1.009  1.003, 1.015  0.0020 
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Table 4. Multivariable analysis for outcome of EVAR adoption. 
Variable  Odds Ratio  95% CI  P Value 
Mean age in years (Per 1 
year) 
1.041   1.032, 1.051  <0.0001 
       
Female (vs. male) 
gender: 
0.613   0.518, 0.725  <0.0001 
       
Co-morbidity (yes vs. 
no) 
     
Congestive Heart Failure  0.073   0.008, 0.704  0.0236 
Peripheral vascular 
disorders 
0.732  0.626, 0.855  <0.0001 
Diabetes mellitus, 
uncomplicated 
1.479  1.240, 1.765  <0.0001 
Solid tumor without 
metastases 
1.883  1.287, 2.755  0.0011 
Coagulopathy  0.284  0.191, 0.422  <0.0001 
Weight loss  0.364  0.185, 0.717  0.0035 
Fluid and electrolyte 
disorders 
0.275  0.215, 0.352  <0.0001 
Deficiency anemias  0.602  0.467, 0.776  <0.0001 
       
Admission status:       
Elective (vs. emergent)  1.704  1.272, 2.282  0.0004 
       
Hospital location:       
Urban (vs. rural)  0.582  0.288, 1.179  0.1330 
       
Hospital control:       
Government or private, 
collapsed category 
Reference     
Government, nonfederal, 
public 
0.582  0.288, 1.179  0.5367 
Private, non-profit, 
voluntary 
0.816  0.428, 1.555  0.0281 
Private, investor-owned  1.071  0.571, 2.012  0.8299 
Private, collapsed 
category 
0.494  0.203, 1.201  0.1198 
       
Hospital market 
characteristics: 
 
     
HHI in market defined by 
variable radius (90%) (per 
0.1 decrease in HHI) 
 
 
1.127 
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1.102, 1.154 
 
 
 
 
0.0127 
 
 
 
 
       
Vascular Volume per 
Hospital 
     
Vascular volume per 
hospital estimated by total 
AAA procedures in 2003 
(Per 1 additional 
procedure) 
 
1.008 
1.005, 1.011  <0.0001 
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Table 5. Covariate balancing between EVAR and open-AAA repair patients after 
propensity-score inverse weighting 
 
Variable  Weighted frequency (S.E.) 
  EVAR 
(Weighted 
N=16,383) 
OPEN 
(Weighted 
N=18,916) 
Unadjusted P 
value 
 
Propensity-
score adjusted P 
value 
Age in years 
(mean) 
73.55 
(±0.20) 
71.46 (±0.16)  <0.0001  0.8017 
         
Female gender:  16.66 
(±0.74) 
24.01 (±0.66)  <0.0001  0.5505 
         
Primary payer:         
Medicare  80.99 
(±0.97) 
76.55 (±0.89)  Reference  Reference 
Medicaid  1.11 (±0.20)  1.32 (±0.19)  0.2985  0.8361 
Private including 
HMO 
16.10 
(±0.91) 
20.45 (±0.84)  0.0001  0.9255 
Self-pay  0.48 (±0.14)  0.63 (±0.13)  0.3121  0.7636 
No charge  0.11 (±0.06)  0.09 (±0.5)  0.7993  0.8552 
Other  1.20 (±0.25)  0.97 (±0.21)  0.5498  0.3445 
         
Co-morbidity         
Congestive heart 
failure 
0.03 (±0.03)  0.80 (±0.15)  0.0012  0.0375 
Peripheral 
vascular 
disorders 
31.72 
(±1.04) 
37.97 (±1.17)  <0.0001  0.3251 
Chronic 
pulmonary 
disease 
29.88 
(±0.92) 
37.05 (±1.02)  <0.0001  0.6471 
Diabetes 
mellitus, 
uncomplicated 
13.45 
(±0.68) 
10.43 (±0.51)  <0.0001  0.2613 
Renal failure  2.74 (±0.30)  5.15 (±0.43)  <0.0001  0.1400 
Lymphoma  0.66 (±0.14)  0.36 (±0.10)  0.0814  0.9708 
Metastatic 
cancer 
0.69 (±0.14)  0.30 (±0.09)  0.0230  0.8001 
Solid tumor 
without 
metastases 
3.14 (±0.33)  1.73 (±0.21)  <0.0001  0.9014 
Coagulopathy  2.38 (±0.37)  8.92 (±0.63)  <0.0001  0.1347 
Weight loss  0.44 (±0.12)  2.62 (±0.33)  <0.0001  0.6525 
Fluid and 
electrolyte 
disorders 
6.09 (±0.52)  21.03 (±0.96)  <0.0001  0.1501 45 
 
Chronic blood 
loss anemia 
0.64 (±0.17)  1.41 (±0.21)  0.0040  0.4219 
Deficiency 
anemias 
5.72 (±0.58)  9.16 (±0.65)  <0.0001  0.5411 
Alcohol abuse  1.39 (±0.28)  2.44 (±0.28)  0.0125  0.8940 
Psychoses  0.69 (±0.14)  1.38 (±0.19)  0.0032  0.1596 
         
Admission 
status: 
       
Elective 
88.33 
(±1.60) 
80.40 (±1.15)  <0.0001  0.7870 
         
Hospital 
control: 
       
Government or 
private, collapsed 
category 
67.98 
(±3.66) 
66.09 (±2.37)  Reference  Reference 
Government, 
nonfederal, 
public 
2.67 (±0.90)  3.56 (±0.92)  0.2026  0.7986 
Private, non-
profit, voluntary 
22.77 
(±3.31) 
19.79 (±1.98)  0.4553  0.4181 
Private, investor-
owned 
5.03 (±1.36)  7.29 (±1.02)  0.1718  0.6679 
Private, 
collapsed 
category 
1.54 (±0.71)  3.27 (±1.09)  0.0146  0.6887 
         
Hospital 
location: 
       
Urban 
95.83 
(±1.30) 
92.82 (±1.32)  0.0318  0.9562 
         
Hospital 
teaching status: 
       
Teaching 
61.01 
(±3.88) 
53.78 (±2.54)  0.0262  0.4749 
         
Vascular 
Volume per 
Hospital 
       
Vascular volume 
per hospital 
estimated by 
total AAA repairs 
59.63 
(±7.94) 
41.72 (±4.98)  0.0020  0.5132 
 
 46 
 
Figure 1: Sample calculation of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. 
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Figure 2: EVAR adoption trends between 2001 and 2007 for non-ruptured AAA repairs.  
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Figure 3: Geographic variation in percent EVAR utilization across the US (2001-2007). 
 